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SYMBIOSIS: THE "TAKINGS" REGULATION AND THE
FUTURE OF PUBLIC LANDS
Don Torgenrud
I. INTRODUCTION
The challenge of improving the quality of the environment through
land use regulation may largely focus on the "taking" clause of the Fifth
Amendment: "[n] or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." This crucial nexus of constitutional law, environmen-
tal quality, and the public lands may speak to many of the grave problems
which are now imminent: the draining of our aquifers, the rights to water
from streams and rivers, acid rain and the loss of forests and the death of
lakes. The destiny of our environment, even our way of life, may depend
upon the interpretation of the parameters of land use regulation by the
United States Supreme Court.
This examination of the law of eminent domain begins with an
analysis of the foundations of judicial review, and ends with a survey of
possible future trends. The hope is to gain an overview; the challenge of
developing a comprehensive strategy has been left to some future effort. A
purely historical or logical explication of the past or current trends is
obviated for the reasons set forth in the section dealing with judicial review
and stare decisis.
II. THE MANNER OF THE PROCESS
When considering the development of the constitutional law of
eminent domain, it is evident that there is no single theoretical formula
which can be found to explain the "crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court
doctrine." 1 There are two major problems inherent in this lack of a
reasonable pattern which would fit the Court's decisions. First, there is the
problem of predictability, and second, the problem of social and political
acceptance of a vital political organ and its function within the structure of
our government. Archibald Cox writes that "the legitimacy of the great
constitutional decisions rests upon the accuracy of the Court's perception
of this kind of common will and upon the Court's ability, by expressing its
perception, ultimately to command a consensus."' Cox notes that this
ability to command respect is the single strongest element that averted a
constitutional crisis during Watergate. It is Cox's fear that when the
Supreme Court fails to extract from a ruling a sufficiently powerful
1. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63, 63.
2. See A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 118 (1976).
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abstract rule which will rise above the case, the Court may face the crucial
problem of failure to command respect, and severe questions of legitimacy.
For Cox, the single most important function of law in a free society is the
power to command acceptance and support from the community; the
Court's failure to do its job properly may prevent it from performing the
vital constitutional role assigned to it.3
Cox is certainly correct when he sees that the perceived legitimacy of
the Court is vital in enabling the Court to command respect for the law, and
in enabling it to perform its constitutional role. However, is Cox correct in
his assumption that a vital exercise of the Court is the production of truly
general rules of law? Is the production of a truly general rule of law
possible?
Certainly predictability of the law is very important to practicing
lawyers as well as governmental bodies. Many commentators believe, as
does Cox, that there is a fundamental law, which though often unex-
pressed, runs deeply beneath Constitution, governmental structure, and
statutes. It is the expression of these deeply held values which is the
function of the Court, and it is this expression of values which lifts the
Court, and our law, to the sublime.
Of course, there are commentators who would not subscribe to such a
view. And in this context, although the foundation of jurisprudence is
different, there would still be the impetus for a production of general rules,
and reasonable patterns of decision-making required of the Court, but for
different reasons than those espoused by Cox. This is not to discount the
importance of general rule productions per se, but only to assign to that
function of the Court a less important role than that of the Court's
constitutional function.
We must be aware of the severity of the position which the judiciary in
general has been placed. Structurally the courts are equal partners in a tri-
partite government. Nevertheless, the courts, unlike the other two
branches of government, face gnawing problems of legitimacy and
justification. In a society which views democratic governance as the
crowning achievement of its values the Court is neither popularly chosen,
nor designed to implement the popular will; it is essentially non-
majoritarian.4 In order to survive and command respect, and to fulfill its
structural function, the Court must rely on the popular perceptions of its
operation: honesty, fairness, and equity. These are the supposed bases of
judicial decision-making. Basic to this popular perception is that we have a
government of law, not of men. Our law is considered separate from and
3. See A. Cox, supra note 2, at 118.
4. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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superior to politics, economics, morality, culture, and especially the
personal values or preferences of judges.
The theoretical social insurance policy is contained in doctrines of
subservience to the Constitution, statutory law, and the doctrine of stare
decisis. The supposed operation of these doctrines takes place in a quasi-
scientific, objective, legal analysis on the part of our rigorous and expertly
trained legal scholars, judges and lawyers. Any particular case should
unfold and be decided thus: some expertly trained judge or lawyer looks at
the case, spots the issues, looks to the law (wonderful predictability), and
then the evidence relevant to the case is obtained by objective hearings and
evidentiary rules that ensure that truth will be found. Then, the proper
result comes about through a routine application of the law to the facts.
Any reasonably competent judge will reach the proper conclusions.
Of course we know that Legal Realism has long since shown this
popular model of judicial decision-making false. The problem lies in the
fact that this is essentially the justification which popularly legitimizes
judicial review, and this is the model that the judiciary and lawyers use
formally in the process of their duties, especially if under popular or
political attack. When popular debate over judicial decisions takes place
the focus is usually upon perceived deviations from the ideal, rather than on
substantive issues, or social significance. In fact, such is the dynamic of
revolution: the law has somehow become illegitimate, the law becomes
something to be established against the existing law. In turn the judiciary
takes refuge in the model by supplying such idealized forms of legal
reasoning as "balancing tests," wherein judges decide between conflicting
policies or interests as if there were objective or neutral answers available:
as if it were possible to perform such a balancing independent of political,
social, or personal values.
Therefore, although we may reject the model as a true and accurate
description of what the legal process is, we are nonetheless bound to it in
order to function. Unlike the popular perception, however, the problem is
not that courts deviate from accepted norms of legal reasoning. The
problem is that there is no legal reasoning that provides us a methodology
for reaching particular, correct results. Judicial decisions are predicated
upon a complex soup of social, political, empirical, institutional ingredients
but are necessarily expressed in terms of the prevailing popular model.
There can be no doubt that judicial decisions elaborate a distinctly
recognizable system of discourse and body of knowledge. The system has
its own language and rubric, its own logic and custom, and may be seen as
so distinct, and in some cases, all embracing, as to amount to a separate
culture. In fact many lawyers' lives are completely circumscribed by their
legal habit: their law firm, the courthouse. The style becomes a way of life.
Justice, however, has always been committed to the challenge of develop-
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ing a process of making proper decisions, and of determining a method to
ensure correct results and rules. Here the law becomes a rich and reflexive
resource, which provides a conflicting series of stylized rationalizations in
which a case may participate in many forms. When facing the welter of
choices-the crazy-quilt patchwork of "takings" cases-we may begin to
realize that precedent and stare decisis will aid us only to the limited extent
of the power those conceptions hold upon the legitimizing norms within
which we must function. What we may want to say to ourselves is that
somehow this is wrong because in areas of judicial discretion the true
standards are moral and political validity, and not whether most, or
perhaps any judge follows the principles of the popular model. The most
crucial problem of our age is the lack of accepted moral theory and
authority.
On the one hand we are bound by the manner of the process: working
with the old words in our mouths as a veil which masks the socio-political
logic at work beneath the veneer. On the other hand we must produce a
result which the situation truly requires: judicial review must fulfill a real
as well as an ideal function. As noted earlier, the true standards are moral
and political validity, and in order to bring these to the case full personal
moral participation is as necessary as a deep understanding of the socio-
political requirements of the case. Therefore an historical consideration of
the problem is necessary on both counts.
III. PUBLIC USE AND JUST COMPENSATION
Prior to the Civil War the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment, as a part of the Bill of Rights, did not proscribe interferences
by the states with private property.' Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment
was one of the first specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees.0 Consequently
the states were bound to the same constitutional standards as the federal
government. Although the early Supreme Court decisions do not specifi-
cally incorporate the compensation clause, they appear to hold that the
public use and just compensation requirements are an intrinsic and
inherent characterization of due process.
"General principles of law, enforceable in a proper forum, had settled
that no form of legislative authority could be employed to serve private
ends: taking, taxing, and regulation were all linked to the public good and
5. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532 (1948);Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833).
6. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 266 (1897) (just compensation)
and Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (property may not be taken for "private"
rather than "public" use).
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depended for their legitimacy upon the preservation of that link."'7 And yet,
in Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase expressed the depth of the moral and
political proscription against any law which would "take property from A
and give it to B."8 Although the original impetus was jurisdictional, the
substantive aspects of due process subsequently become more significant in
later rulings.
The central concern of the Fifth Amendment is simply that private
property may not be taken for a public use without just compensation.
However, the central issue in most takings cases is whether or not what the
government has done is a "taking." In addition, some specialized doctrines
have developed concerning the meaning of "just compensation" and
"public use," which are not central to the issues of our consideration, but
nonetheless deserve some inspection.
As with any constitutional requirement, searching for a single ruling
principle is treacherous business.9 Justice Holmes provided the most basic
rule when he wrote that the standard for just compensations was "what the
owner lost, not what the taker has gained."10 Generally the courts look to
the market value of the property. As with other aspects of constitutional
adjudication, a single principle does not rule and the market value test is
not exclusive. In United States v. Fuller11 the Supreme Court used a test
based upon "equitable principles of fairness."1 The recent case of Penn
Central Co. v. New York"3 develops a novel idea. In hopes of protecting
historical landmarks, the owners of the landmarks may participate in a
system called "transferable development rights" wherein the owners are
7. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457 (1978).
8. 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 269, 271 (1798) (seriatim opinion). The Tenth Amendment reserves to the
state the powers of eminent domain. For extent of United States powers see Kohn v. United States, 91
U.S. (I Otto) 367 (1876).
9. Laurence Tribe goes all the way back to Kantian principles (see I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS) for his rather Christian Natural Law view of the basis of compensation
and to Bentham (see J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION). For the utilitarian metaphysicsee Tribe,
supra at 463.
Whether traced to a principle that society simply should not exploit individuals in order to
achieve its goals, or to an idea that such exploitation causes too much dissatisfaction from a
strictly utilitarian point of view unless it is brought under control, the just compensation
requirement appears to express a limit on government's power to isolate particular
individuals for sacrifice to the general good."
TRIBE, supra note 6, at 483.
10. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
11. 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
12. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA AND R. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 449 (1978)(".. .United
States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943), where the Supreme Court
held that in condemning land the federal government need not take into consideration in valuing the
property the loss of business opportunity dependent on the owner's privilege to use the state's power of
eminent domain.").
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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allowed to transfer given "rights" to other property (i.e.-exceeding height
restrictions) as compensation for the decreased value of the historic
landmarks. Whether the court has thus developed a new concept of "just
compensation," remains to be seen.
The early interpretation of what constituted "public use" was whether
or not the use was for "the public good, the public necessity, or the public
utility.' 4 In fact, the prohibition against taking expressed against the
federal government's power in the Fifth Amendment, and applied against
the states in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause became
operative only after it was clear that a genuine public purpose was
involved.1 5 If genuine public purpose was absent, then no amount of
compensation would suffice, so great was the vice. By the latter half of the
Nineteenth Century, however, such a broad, simplistic view had been
abandoned. Because the power of eminent domain had been granted to
various private enterprises, a much more discrete view evolved."6 The
modern outlook is contained in the unanimous decision in Berman v.
Parker,"7 wherein the Court upheld legislation which authorized the
government to take private property and sell it to a private management
organization to be redeveloped for private use. The modern view seems to
be one of deference to the legislative claims of acting in the interest of
public health, safety and welfare, although the Court has retained in
theory the power of review. Therefore the prevailing standard would be
whether or not the exercise of the taking bears any reasonable relationship
of the means to the ends.
IV. PENNSYLVANIA COAL AND STARE DECISIS
The hard cases in eminent domain law occur whenever the govern-
ment does not physically appropriate or damage the property. 18 Cases of
transfer of title or physical damage are usually fairly clearcut and
obviously intended to be compensable. The hard cases, however, are where
the government regulates the property in some manner, and as a conse-
quence substantially reduces the value of the property. There can be no
question about the compensation which occurs when a non-acquisitive
regulation impairs the value of property.
14. Comment, The Public Use Doctrine: "Advance Requiem" Revisited, 1959 LAW & SOC.
ORD. 689, 689.
15. The prohibition against a taking applies to the judicial and executive, as well as the
legislative branches. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
16. Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599, 602-03 (1949).
17. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
18. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 51 (1973). See especially
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179-80 (1871).
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Whether or not such a non-acquisitive regulation may be compensa-
ble is clear. The Court has ruled that such regulation may constitute a
taking. What is not clear is that no general rule exists to describe the
conditions that must be met to justify compensation vis-a-vis regulation.
To date, the only approximation of a general rule is Justice Holmes'
statement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: "The general rule at least
is, that which property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."19 Holmes made it clear that
he felt that the difference between regulation and physical appropriation or
damage was not one of kind, but one of degree. The central question of
when regulation reaches the point of compensation is left unanswered, to be
decided on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, each ad hoc set of events can be seen
as a plot on a continuum between the exercise of eminent domain and the
valid regulation by the police power. There have even been studies done on
a "bases of percentage relationship" where the upholding of the regula-
tions was correlated to the diminution of value to the owner.2 °
Several commentators believe that the essential polarity is that
expressed in the conflicting views of the elder Justice Harlan and Justice
Holmes.2" In Mugler v. Kansas22 Harlan viewed "taking" in a literal,
certain sense when upholding a Kansas enactment outlawing the sale of
alcoholic beverages, thereby destroying Mugler's brewery business.
Harlan clearly believed that no compensation was due absent appropria-
tion for the use of the government. The case of Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon28 concerned an area of Northeastern Pennsylvania which was rich
in coal. The extensive digging of mine shafts and the taking of coal from
beneath the surface had caused, and was causing, extensive surface
19. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
20. Uncompensated losses inexcess of 75% of a property's value caused by regulation have
been sustained both before Pennsylvania Coal, . Haddachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
405 (1915) (88%) and after Pennsylvania Coal, . Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365,384 (1926) (75%). In Goldblattv. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) a
town which had expanded around a sand and gravel mining operation amended its zoning
laws to "prohibit any excavating below the water table and to impose an affirmative duty to
refill any excavation presently below that level. . . . Although the owner had argued that
the ordinance totally destroyed the economic value of his property, and although the New
York Court of Appeals had found the ordinance was amended as a part of "a systematic
attempt to force [the owner] out of business. . .under the guise of regulation. . .the
Supreme Court found 'no evidence in the. . .record which even remotely suggests that
prohibition of further mining will reduce the value of the lot in question.' Thus the Court saw
no need to decide now far regulation may go before it becomes a takings.
TRIBE, supra note 6, at 460 n.3.
21. Bosselman, Callies & Banta, supra note 18, at 105-29; and NOVAK, ROTUNDA AND YOUNG,
supra note 11, at 441.
22. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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subsidence. The earth was literally falling away beneath the towns and
cities in the nine-county 5000 square mile region. To deal with this
problem, the Pennsylvania Legislature had passed the Kohler Act which
prohibited the mining of coal in any manner which would cause the
subsidence of any building, structure, or transportation route within a
designated place or municipality.24 Holmes obviously felt that allowing
someone to keep their property, but denying them the use of it was
tantamount to transfer of title and an outright appropriation. Although the
polar views of Harlan and Holmes are too reductionist, the intuitive grasp
of the continuum is valuable. What is at work here is the strife between our
idealized popular model of legal reasoning and the value preferences of the
judges involved, as well as the shifting socio-economic and political sands
of history.
Perhaps Mugler is a case from a more classical era of legal thought
when lawyers were less sophisticated. In any event, it will fall to the Court
to attempt to assume the posture of value-free arbiters, neutral and
independent exponents of the law, unaffected by social and economic
relations, political forces, or the culture of our age and people. Tradition-
ally, jurisprudence has chosen to ignore social and historical relations of
change and maturation. As a consequence the dominant system of values
has been declared value free so that all conflict and inequity is masked by
the ideology of objectivity and neutrality.
The antithesis of Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal permits a focus on
one of the basis constructs of legal reasoning: stare decisis. The notion that
judicial review is bound by, or at least deferential to precedent, thus
restricting the play of discretion, is at the foundation. If traditional legal
reasoning has any meaning, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis
should lead to predictable results in specific cases. Nevertheless, every
lawyer knows that some precedents are followed while others are not. In
addition, there are cases in which the significance of precedent is not
clearly defined. How does judicial review accept or reject legal precedent?
How is ambiguous precedent assimilated into the system? Does precedent
really matter? The truth is that stare decisis conveniently atrophies with
disuse whenever the courts so desire, and especially at times when the
legitimacy and power of the courts are enhanced by rejecting continuity in
favor of a socio-economic shift in policy.
In the early 1800's the long venerated legal principles of property,
exchange, and social relations conflicted with the evolving social commit-
ment of the government to economic development. The early American
view of land as a source of enjoyment in its natural state rather than as an
24. Act of July 26, 1913, Public Law No. 1439, § 6.
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instrument of production was at odds with the new needs for construction
of the means of the production, such as mills and dams. In that setting, the
upstream and downstream land owners had established rights and patterns
of life that were inconsistent with the coming socio-economic evolution.
Therefore, when the judiciary saw the law as an instrument for the
promotion of the socially desirable expansion of laissez-faire capitalism,
stare decisis was rejected as a tool of adjudication. After the basic
transformation had been accomplished, near mid-century, the new legal
values were with the re-emergence of legal formalism, enshrined in the
renewed operation of stare decisis. It was clear, however, that this rebirth
of deference to precedent encompassed only the recently transformed legal
standards.
Viewing Mugler as the product of a more classical era of legal
reasoning, and Pennsylvania Coal as the exemplary case of the Lochner
era, may be simplifying somewhat excessively. Our commitment, however,
is to the present and future, and our challenge is to divine and understand
what "magic phrases" or "magic words" from the past will be determina-
tive today. Stare decisis, although an integral part of the legal myth-
model, serves primarily an ideological, and not a functional role in legal
reasoning. Certainly some strategists will perceive that the Court need
never overrule Pennsylvania Coal to proceed (Mugler has never been
overruled), and the Court may continue, unabashed, to ignore Penn-
sylvania Coal and create new law (as it certainly should).
What practical purpose could motivate one to study the development
of the takings cases? Ignoring the mythical "functional" role of precedent,
understanding the basis of social, economic, and political change, and
understanding that when courts determine meanings, facts, and applica-
bility of law to fact, a social and political judgment is also being made, then
we must balance these requirements against those of the needed legitimacy
of the decision in terms of community respect and acceptance. There is a
veil of illusion that must be pierced in order to operate effectively as lawyers
within the system. But the myth-model demands of the community must
also be left intact: the "magic phrases" and "magic words," although
masquerading as neutral and objective explications of the case, are there
only to cater to the popular demand for conformity to the as yet
unrevolutionized conceptions of legal legitimacy.
Pennsylvania Coal is a mass of contradictions in its own right. The two
issues argued by the coal company were the impaired obligation of
contracts (which had certain merit, as the deed in question clearly waived
any claim against the coal company and the mineral rights were clearly
severed) and the taking issue, which the Court chose to address. Holmes
wrote: "This is the case of a single private house. . .a source of damage to
such a house is not a public nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on
[Vol. 4
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others in different places. The damage was not common or public. '2 5 This
is a somewhat astounding view in fact because:
Scranton bid fair to become a second Verdun, her buildings
sagged to the ground by shots from below. While every section of
the city was more or less affected the worst devastation was in the
heart of the business section of West Scranton. Visitors there
today [ 1922] can clamber through pits strewn with broken bricks
and rubbish covering great areas formerly improved with hand-
some business blocks but now permitted, in the words of
Governor Sproul [of Pennsylvania], "to revert to the wilderness
of abandon." Our once level streets are in humps and sags, our
gas mains have broken, our water mains threatened to fail us in
times of conflagration, our sewers spread their pestilential
contents into the soil, our buildings have collapsed under their
occupants or fallen into the streets, our people have been
swallowed up in suddenly growing chasms, blown up by gas
explosions or asphyxiated in their sleep, our cemetaries have
opened and the bodies of our dead have been torn from their
caskets.26
There were thousands of square miles of Pennsylvania affected including
several large cities like Scranton.
Two things of importance can be taken from Pennsylvania Coal:
First, the balancing test and, second, the dissent of Justice Brandeis.
The balancing test eschews the test of reasonable relationship to a
valid public purpose and instead weighs the social value of the regulation
against the loss in property value to the property owner.27 This is a test that
no longer seems historically justified. Admittedly, values should be
balanced, but perhaps a more viable approach would be through the
Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees. Historically, this body of
law seems a sufficient safeguard for the property owner.
In fact, when reading Brandeis' dissent the truly anomalous nature of
Pennsylvania Coal becomes apparent:
Coal in place is land; and the right of the owner to use land is not
absolute. He may not so use it as to cause a public nuisance; and
uses, once harmless, may owing to changed conditions seriously
threaten the public welfare. Whenever they do, the legislature
has power to prohibit such uses without paying just compensa-
tion; and the power to prohibit extends alike to the manner, the
25. 260 U.S. at 413.
26. Brief on Behalf of the City of Scranton, Intervenor, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, October term, 1922, at 1. See also BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, supra note 18, at 124f.
27. 260 U.S. 412 (1922).
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character and the purpose of the use.28
And again,
If by mining anthracite coal the owner would necessarily unloose
poisonous gases, I suppose no one would doubt the power of the
state to prevent the mining, without buying his coal fields. And
why may not the state, likewise, without paying compensation,
prohibit one from digging so deep or excavating near the surface,
as to expose the community to like dangers? In the latter case, as
in the former, carrying on the business would be a public
nuisance. 9
Holmes had certainly declared the mineral estate to be the dominant estate
with a vengeance.
V. AVERAGE RECIPROCITY AND Noxious UsE
In order to answer the question "when can regulation be considered a
taking," one needs to study the challenges to zoning and environmental
laws in state and lower federal courts, for such challenges have rarely come
to the Supreme Court in recent years.30 The following is a quick overview of
the few recent Supreme Court cases. In Agins v. Tiburon,31 the power of
zoning to diminish the "value" of the appellants' property was upheld.
However, the controversial issue that remained unanswered was whether a
state may refuse to grant damages for inverse condemnation and restrict
the remedy to invalidation of the unconstitutional regulation. Four
justices 2 harkened back to Pennsylvania Coal when reproaching the
California court for not recognizing "the essential similarity of 'regulatory
takings' and other 'takings.' ""
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States" a pond, considered private
property, was converted into a marina and a channel was dug allowing
ships to travel into a bay, and thence to the ocean, thereby becoming a
navigable waterway and falling under regulation of the Army Corps of
Engineers. The Court held that Corps regulations pertained to the
waterway, but that the government could not require the lessees of the
marina to allow free public access. The Court could not simply convert
private property into public property without just compensation. 5
28. 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. 260 U.S. at 417.
30. See BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, supra note 18, parts I, II, and IIl.
31. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
32. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell.
33. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
34. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
35. Id. at 177-81.
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In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins,36 the Court supported the
California ruling interpreting California's Constitution whereby the
owners of private shopping centers were prohibited from excluding persons
engaging in non-disruptive free speech. In distinguishing Kaiser Aetna, the
Court in Pruneyard held that the right to exclude others was not a basic
economic value of the shopping center, while the proposed public access to
the private marina in Kaiser Aetna interfered with "reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations." Thus, regulation must not deny the property
owner the primary economic use of the property, and must advance a
legitimate government goal.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,3 7 the Court
substituted a per se rule in place of the multi-factor balancing heritage of
Pennsylvania Coal in cases of "permanent physical occupations." The
Court struck down a New York law which required a landlord to permit
cable television companies to install the cable in rental property. Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority claimed the per se rule did not conflict
with history and amounted to a reaffirmation of "the traditional rule that a
permanent physical occupation of property is a taking." 8 The dissenters 9
condemned the decision as "curiously anachronistic" and complained that
such a rule may "undercut a carefully-considered legislative judgment"
and that "history teaches that takings claims are properly evaluated under
a multi-factor balancing test. By directing that all 'permanent physical
occupations' automatically are compensable, the Court does not further
equity so much as it encourages litigants to manipulate their factual
allegations to gain the benefit of the per se rule."'40 Here is yet another
historic lesson unlearned: how analogous is the cable television industry to
the telephone company of yesteryear? Or the public utilities? It surely
seems that technological advancements are always initially disadvantaged
by the courts.
The only recent Supreme Court case of real interest was Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,41 wherein New York City's historic
landmarks protection regulation was contested as a regulatory taking.
Grand Central Terminal was designated an historic landmark, which
meant that the owners would be obligated to keep the building in good
repair and obtain commission approval before making any exterior
alteration. The Court undertook an extensive review of taking-regulations
36. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
37. 458 U.S. 1966 (1982).
38. Id.
39. Justices Blackmun, Brennan and White.
40. 458 U.S.
41. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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precedent and accepted the dictates of Pennsylvania Coal that the
standards were ad hoc factual inquiries and that the balancing was
between the regulation for the benefit of the "health, safety, morals, or
general welfare," and the private interest in a "distinct investment-backed
expectation ... - The Court found that the interference with the
owner's property was not of such magnitude as to come under the rule of
Pennsylvania Coal. 43 As usual Rehnquist, Burger and Stevens in dissent-
ing were more interested in property rights concepts than general welfare
concepts.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central listed two possible
exceptions to the takings rule. The first was the permissible prohibition of
noxious uses based upon the safety, health or welfare of others. The second
was the foundation of zoning regulation which "secure an average
reciprocity of advantage." Brennan's majority opinion felt the historic
landmark regulation akin to regulation against noxious uses of land, an
implementation of a policy expected to produce widespread public benefit,
applicable to all similarly situated.
As noted previously, a great deal of taking litigation occurs in state
and lower federal courts. Perhaps at least one newer wrinkle should be
noted. In 1966 the State of Wisconsin enacted the Shoreland Protection
Act4" which compelled local governments to move toward protection of the
shores of Wisconsin's many lakes and waterways. Marinette County
enacted a shoreland ordinance in compliance with the State's directive.
The property owners in question, the Justs, owned a shoreline lot which had
a stand of trees at the back and a marsh in the front. The Justs began to fill
the front of the lot and Marinette County enjoined the Justs' actions. In the
appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Just v. Marinette County,45
the Court proceeded to describe the now familiar test of Pennsylvania
Coal:
The distinction between the exercise of the police power and
condemnation has been said to be a matter of degree of damage to
the property owner. In the valid exercise of the police power
reasonably restricting the use of property, the damage suffered
42. Id. at 115-16.
43. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 553 (1982),
[f]or other confrontations with the "takings" problem by the post-Lochner era Court, note
the decisions sustaining compensation for "takings" by low flying airplanes and rejecting
arguments that the injuries were "merely incidental" consequences of authorized air
navigation, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), and Griggsv. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962); and see also a series of cases holding losses from wars and riots non-
compensable.
44. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 144.26, § 59.971 (West 1966).
45. 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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by the owner is said to be incidental. However, where the
restriction is so great that the landowner ought not to bear such a
burden for the public good, the restriction has been held to be a
constructive taking even though the actual use or forbidden use
has not been transferred to the government so as to be a taking in
the traditional sense.46
The Wisconsin Court, however, follows closely the Brandeis dissent in
Pennsylvania Coal. Brandeis' view of taking and regulation was that these
concepts were concepts which were differential in kind and not degree,
which is contrary to Holmes' view. Brandeis, the legal researcher and
scholar, always relied on volumes of historic, socio-economic and political
evidence as a basis for his decisions. This is because Brandeis was
concerned with facts: he knew of the economic burdens involved and knew
of the diminution of value to the property owner:
But all values are relative. . .the rights of an owner as against
the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his
property into surface and subsoil. . .the conclusion seems to rest
upon the assumption that in order to justify such exercise of the
police power there must be an "average reciprocity of advan-
tage" as between the owner of the property restricted and the rest
of the community; and that here such reciprocity is ab-
sent. . .but where the police power is exercised, not to confer
benefits upon property owners but to protect the public from
detriment and danger, there is in my opinion, no room for
considering reciprocity of advantage.47
It is obvious that Brandeis felt that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the one hand, and voluminous socio-economic and political
evidence on the other was sufficient to solve any regulations problems.48
"Takings" were a substantially different sort of problem from the
regulation of property use.
The Wisconsin Court held that:
what makes this case different from most condemnation or police
power zoning cases is the interrelationship of the methods, the
swamps and the natural environment of shorelands to the purity
of the water and to such natural resources as navigation, fishing,
46. Id. at 767, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
47. 260 U.S. at 422.
48. See Nashville C & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935). Brandeis' majority
opinion found the Tennessee action unreasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See also
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas & Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey
Clay Mfg. Co., 298 U.S. 334 (1932); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926); Pierce Oil Company v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135
(1920).
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and scenic beauty. Swamps and wetland were once considered
waste land, undesirable, and not picturesque. But as the people
become more sophisticated, an appreciation was acquired that
swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, and a part of the
balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water in
our lakes and streams. Swamps and wetlands are a necessary part
of the ecological creation and now, even to the uninitiated,
possess their own beauty in nature. 9
The Court reasoned that if the proposed use of the property would result in
public harm, then no compensation was required. On the other hand, if the
regulation conferred a public benefit then such control would be beyond the
role of the police power.
The Justs argued their property has been severely depreciated in
value. But this depreciation of value is not based on the use of the
land in its natural state but on what the land would be worth if it
could be filled in and used for dwelling. While the loss of value is
to be considered in determining whether a restriction is a
constructive taking, value based upon changing the character of
the land at the expense of harm to public rights is not an essential
factor or controlling.50
VI. DAMAGES: INVERSE CONDEMNATION, CIVIL RIGHTS, RESTRAINT
OF TRADE
The pre-industrial revolution viewpoint that land in its natural state
was of value in itself is emerging again. The Lochner era is ending, and with
it the viewpoint that private commercial exploitation of lands and
resources are superior to the rights of the public to a safe and clean
environment. It is now becoming obvious that the acceptance of the
dominant value scheme as neutral has placed all competing value systems
at a disadvantage. What has happened has been that regulation of the use
of land which has interfered with a property owner's right to make a profit
from the land has created a constitutional right in the owner of land
exploited, even in the face of harm to the public lands. This certainly
cannot have been the intent of the Framers. Land as a commodity has been
an evolution of capitalist economy, and should be clearly seen as such.
At first we must agree that no one has the right to use his property with
utter disregard for the effects of such use upon others. Historically this is
the basis for the evolution of the law of nuisance. Over the centuries of the
English and American law this doctrine has prescribed parameters of
various interests in property. Seen in the light of centuries of uses, property
49. 201 N.W.2d at 768.
50. 201 N.W.2d at 771.
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rights have never been absolute. The community, initially the sovereign,
has retained the prerogative to legislate for the health, morals, safety, and
general welfare in spite of the burdens placed on the use and enjoyment of
private property. This exercise of power is commonly called the police
power.
The usual theory of land use law assumes a balancing between the
rights of the individual property holder to the use and enjoyment of
property and the general welfare of the community, or the police power.
There still rages a debate in the law of eminent domain over whether or not,
and at what point in regulation of property, the police power has invaded
that last small but sacred precinct of property ownership: there must be
some sticks in that bundle that the community cannot take without
violating some seemingly undefinable basic right. The problem is simply
that such legal reasoning is the product of an era long since dead, but the
rubric and sanctity still holds a mythical sway in the American Frontier
Mentality where land was not only cheap but plentiful ("My God! Next
they'll be tellin' us whut to do with our land!").
Legal Realists have, of course, proved such viewpoints to be not
merely quaint but nonsense. The only sticks in that bundle that the
property owner has any "right" to are those sticks that the police power
says he has a right to: rights are circular legal creations. It always seems as
though what we are balancing in such cases are conflicting rights between
which the court is called upon to choose. It is in the enunciation of that
choice that the Court determines the result and forms the "right." Property
simply means the legally granted power to withhold from others. As such it
is merely the inverse face of the police power, created by the state and given
content by legal decisions that limit or extend the property owner's power
over others. Seen as such, property is an always conditional delegation of
the public right, and simply a form of the police power: property is
necessarily public and not private.
Therefore, the validity of land use regulation is predicated upon the
power to regulate for the benefit of the health, morals, safety or general
welfare of the community. If seen as such, we must examine our basic
premises again. Is the purpose of our constitutional government the aiding
and abetting of class against class in a static socio-economic scheme? Or
are we a democracy, committed to the changing concerns and needs of a
complex social organism? If this is the case perhaps respect for the police
power, and deference to legislatures should rank high in our value
structure-higher than economically based policy. Certainly there is no
doubt that we have progressed along an historic continuum, one where
legislatures provided protections and impetus to labor and industry. But
the modern corporate economy has evolved, as must our legislative
treatment of political economy, and the courts must not stand in the past,
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holding fast to old, outworn, and now destructive ideals. As the representa-
tion of the popular will, legislatures are a strong part of the democratic
process. As the protectors of our basic political values courts have a difficult
position. It becomes imperative for the courts to stick to procedural aspects
of the Constitution wherever possible, and where open-ended areas of the
document are encountered to interpret carefully and with the utmost
diligence, and not simply in terms of a now prevailing, but evolving, value
scheme. It is now fairly clear that the "takings" clause of the Fifth
Amendment is not so open-ended as Holmes and the property-rights
oriented opinions which follow him would have us believe. The procedural
aspects of the clause are fairly explicit and to travel further than that is to
take common sense, common perception, and indulge in excessive sophis-
try. Taking property is physical appropriation, destruction, occupation.
Regulation of property may amount to taking in some sense, but regulation
of property is not the same as taking property. We have become too used to
legal sophistry when we allow the expansion and melding of these two
concepts into one.
Agins v. Tiburon51 and San Diego Gas and Electric v. City of San
Diego5" show a new and dangerous attack upon constitutional integrity at
work in takings cases. This is the attempt to use the theory of inverse
condemnation in order to get damages for property owners whose property
has been regulated by an ordinance subsequently struck down as a
"taking." These rulings did not allow such damages, holding that the
invalidation of the regulation was the only available remedy. Nevertheless
this new tack may be successful in the future in view of the Court's
(especially Rehnquist's) concern with "investment backed expecta-
tions."5 A newer approach to the collection of damages is available, and in
the long run may relieve some of the pressures put upon Fifth Amendment
judicial review of legislative regulation.
The first path which may be taken by litigators is the use of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976). This so-called "Section 1983" remedy is available to
anyone who has been deprived of federal statutory or constitutional rights.
The basic requirements are that a "person" must violate a citizen's rights,
privileges, or immunity under color of a state law which may be a statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage. Money damages and reasonable
attorney's fees may be awarded. In a landmark 1978 decision" the United
51. 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 75 (1979).
52. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
53. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
54. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, noted that:
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion
that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included
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States Supreme Court held that municipalities were persons under Section
1983, and oppressive regulation may be successfully litigated in terms of
injunction, declaratory relief, and monetary damages. 55 The Court's
holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services56 subjected municipal
corporations to liability under Section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act
of 1871. And then, in 1980 the Court decided in Owen v. City of
Independence, Mo.57 that good faith action by the municipal corporation
was no excuse. Thus, a property owner is afforded a full panoply of rights
under Section 1983. One can easily infer that a successful damages suit
could wipe out many a small municipal corporation's budget, for the fiscal
year, or several fiscal years.
The second path that may be taken is relief under federal anti-trust
law, specifically the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 [15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976)] and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 *[15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1976)] .8 In a 1978 ruling, the Court ruled that local governments could
be held liable to federal antitrust claims. 59 The three necessary elements
are whether or not the defendant is a person for purposes of the federal
antitrust law, whether the activity involved interstate commerce and
whether the activity is commercial. As far as the second element is
concerned, there is at least one recent land use decision" wherein out-of-
state purchasers and out-of-state financing was enough to settle the issue in
favor of the plaintiffs. Federal courts have historically gone to great lengths
to find interstate commerce links in order to afford jurisdiction. The courts
must then ask, when considering whether a regulation violates federal
antitrust law: does the regulation operate to unreasonably restrain trade or
among the persons to whom § 1983 applies. Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.
Moreover, although the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body is an
allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the
Constitution, local governments, like every other § 1983 'person' by the very terms of the
statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental
'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's
official decision-making channels. 436 U.S. at 690.
55. See WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOuTs: LAND VALUE COMPENSATION (D. Hagman, D. Misczynski
eds. 1978).See also Monroev. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1960); Owenv. Cityof Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980); Maine v. Thiboutot, 447 U.S. 934 (1980). These cases and the Monell case are the current
leading cases for section 1983 land regulation parameters.
56. See note 55 supra.
57. See note 55 supra.
58. In describing the purpose which motivates this legislation the Supreme Court stated:
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise."
United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
59. City of Lafayette v. Lousiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
60. Stauffers v. Town of Grand Lake, Civil Action No. 80-A-752 (D. Colo. 1983).
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to monopolize a part of trade or commerce?61
A third path that may be taken is that of substantive due process. The
basic protections afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are
still in place and are in the face of oppressive regulation, an especially
viable route for litigation. In fact, if the due process protections are to be
relied upon, the focus of the litigation would shift to questions concerning
the purpose and effect of the regulation in question, which is the center of
the matters that should concern us in such a case.
In view of the crux of the issues, that circumstances have changed and
that our limited natural resources are facing exploitive destruction, it is
time that the courts stopped balancing public benefit against property
owners' losses and applying archaic property rights doctrine to the
balancing process and began protecting the interests of our culture in the
preservation of our natural and aesthetic resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the synergism of ecosystems become more apparent to us the
concepts of "average reciprocity of advantage" which underlies the current
Court's tenor of land use decisions must merge and expand into the old, and
hopefully, new concepts of noxious uses. It is imperative to limit the
damaging impacts of unbridled exploitation if succeeding generations are
to be able to enjoy our environment and use our public lands. Certainly
there will be a balancing of needs, but such a balance must be struck in a
focus upon the purpose and effect of legislation, which is the essence of 14th
Amendment due process review. A balancing between the "absolute"
rights of a property owner and the welfare of the society as a whole creates
rights which may run counter to the welfare of humanity and the rights of
future generations to a clean and safe environment as well as aesthetically
satisfying public lands.
Adam Smith62 laid the foundations of our political economy with a
conception based upon a vision wherein the strife between general interests
and private interests would be overcome in the all-encompassing whole. All
conflicts of interests were to be melted and submerged into the market
place to dissolve into the rational action of supply and demand. This was an
historic vision of freedom. The economic, the social, and the political
worlds began at the same point and progressed upon parallel courses: the
free competition of free subjects and a socio-political search for truth
founded in open self-expression and free dialogue. The rational self
61. For a more complete discussion, see Netter, "Anti-trust Laws and Land Use Regulation,"
APA-Planning and Law Division, 1982.
62. A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOK III, chap. I "Natural Progress of Opulence" (1968
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culminated in enlightened self-interest.
There are many problems with this scenario in the latter half of the
twentieth century. This rationalization of economic life and social organi-
zation is a strictly private matter tied to the rational practice of the
individual (substitute corporate) economic subject, or the multiplicity of
such individual subjects. Supposedly the harmony of the whole is to result
from the relatively undisturbed course of such economic practice. Of
course we have not allowed such practice, for very good reason, to be
relatively undisturbed. The system itself, at the level of monopoly capital
manipulates the system beyond any concepts of "relatively undisturbed."
However, the real problem with the theory is that such privatization of the
economic structure along with socio-political rationalism denies us the end
which is our goal: the rational criticism of the whole whereby there may be
a rational determination of the conditions under which fulfillment of the so-
called free individual might be realized. All is left to the irrational forces of
"harmony" in the market place. Thus all jurisprudence and liberal theory
becomes mere abstraction and the structure and order of the whole
becomes accidental "natural balance." If, to borrow from Holmes, the life
of the law is not logic but experience, we must realize that we are creating,
as well as receiving values. The logic of our struggle to preserve our
environment and our public lands is not that of the individual interest
against the common welfare, but is a struggle for life itself, a life that has a
right to the enjoyment and the preservation of nature, a life that has a right
to emerge and grow in dignity. The internal dynamic of this struggle is the
attempt to translate knowledge into reality, which is the groundwork for
building a bridge between the "is" and the "ought."
"Ought", of course, suggests some standard, some valuation by which
we are to judge our acts and our goals. The lack of such a realistic standard
is our most serious social problem. The current trend of the Court is merely
to institutionalize the prevailing exploitative value structure as value
neutral in an attempt to mask the conflicts and inequities, hoping to
preserve the status quo while appearing objective and impartial. But
history, like art, is an expression of life. In order to guide our social goals it
is necessary to grasp historical truth. What is required is not mere
historicism, but a "critical history" which would allow us to break the grip
of the past by revealing that which must be overcome. This is necessary
where the past oppresses the present; it is dangerous and painful at times
because in order to succeed we must destroy a part of ourselves. To destroy
what is regressive and preserve that which is progressive is the key to
building the models and methods for finding our future.
Against Hegel and the Marxists we should object that history like art,
is not a product of imminent reason; history is full of accident and
irrationality. However, a denial of a perfect order in history does not imply
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a pure chaos. All of the traditional rationalist schools have undermined the
old orders and yet remain impotent to create a substitute. Man, no longer
the essential center of life and creation, has become a meaningless accident
in a vast cosmic mechanism, a mere pawn of mechanical or historic force.
In law, Legal Realism, as modern rationalism in science and philosophy,
has willed values which are not only unreal, but hostile to reality, in place of
life values, life goals. In place of meaning we have Nothing. "Facts" have
become the foundation of all objectivity and "values" have become suspect:
there has become a total contrast between "fact" and "value".
As such we are standing on our head. Man has lost dignity as well as
tragic proportion. From the Christian conception of man as the image of
God we have slid down to man as animal, and finally, to man as atoms in
motion. Truth has become a function of the electro-chemical discharges of
the brain, or as a function of imminent history. Evil and injustice become
meaningless. Pessimism becomes nihilism.
Faced with modern rationalism and Legal Realism how are we to
reconstruct a standard of values? We should ask ourselves what our values
and moral goods are worth: what would we expect of these rules? What
should be our answer? Life. We must be loyal to life. We must be true to our
mother the Earth. Moralities which are oriented towards the benefits of a
group or class, whether "capitalist" or "masses" are at once suspect.
As important as our foundational documents are, there is no blueprint
for Utopia. What has been cast in our foundational documents represents a
very important historical innovation for mankind, such as the Lockean
crystallization of the limits of governmental power of the state and the
protection of the rights of the individual. Unfortunately such concepts have
been twisted into the service of corporate capital (the wolf in sheep's
clothing when called an individual) and the Court persists in extending the
Lochner era into the foreseeable future by imposing a set of values suited to
an era of capital expansion which is no longer justified. The Court as such
seems Quixotic when insisting upon not only an out-dated and unsuitable,
but potentially suicidal, set of values in the face of the needs of our people
and the values of life. Since the Court has chosen this course those who
value life and reality and freedom as opposed to destruction and exploita-
tion must begin to detail clearly the fact that it is the Court, and not the
people who are being unrealistic in the face of history, science and
morality. We must do our utmost to make our side win: the stakes are too
high, we must demand that our Constitution should not be twisted and
tortured and subverted to satisfy the tawdry, destructive and exploitative
goals of the modern corporate capital economy. The logical extension of
Lochner and Pennsylvania Coal allows for the death knell of clean water,
clean air, and the loss of the public lands to our children and their children.
Does it not seem as likely that our energy for exploitation could
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become energy for preservation and conservation given the new values and
the demise of the old values? The new beginning would require a new
consciousness. It is true that the unnatural values of Lochner and
Pennsylvania Coal have stunted our potential. However, our technology
and our rationalism are an expression of energy and self-confidence. Once
we have recognized our power and capacity as a people, and we have also
stripped away the nihilistic values of the past, once we have recognized and
contested the "inevitability" of historicism and modern rationalism, then
we can develop a feeling of moral outrage at the path which the Court has
taken.6"
In this struggle to change this course of events we should define two
basic forms of authority: rational and predatory. Rational authority is that
authority which supplies good reason to believe that human suffering will
diminish and human needs will be fulfilled without an attendant increase in
misery in some other segment of society. Predatory authority only seems
rational to that group or class which seeks to profit by its exercise. 64 The
victims of this exercise find no rationality or justice in the actions. All
exercise of predatory authority should be clearly exposed. The antitheses
between life and exploitative values abound in our society: clean well
scrubbed and "virtuous" pillars of our communities who poison our waters,
spread herbicides, create acid rain and destroy our ecosystems; clean well-
scrubbed and "virtuous" pillars of our communities who are professionals
at dirty deals. All of humanity is left awash in the filthy, poisonous garbage
produced by predatory authority while a small class or group reaps the
transient and questionable rewards of the moment.
Our Constitution may not be an express blueprint for Utopia. But,
conversely, Utopia may not be a fanciful concept. The denial of Utopia by
predatory authority may be only a vicious ideology which is preserved in
order to perpetuate a system of values which, although rightfully a part of
our past, now threatens to destroy our future. Simply put, Utopia may be
blocked from coming about by the establishment. What must happen is the
subordination of the development of our productive capacity and technol-
ogy to rational authority, which is animated by the newly created,
constantly recreated values of life. What possible realistic reasons can
there be for paying farmers not to produce food while a third of our world
starves? What possible realistic reasons allow our aquifers to be drained,
acid rain and the death of lakes and forests, and the impending loss of the
natural and unspoiled beauty of our public lands? Ignorance of a sacred
trust, ignorance of history and life. The triumph of a class over the whole of
63. See B. MOORE, INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASIS OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT 440-459 (1981).
64. Id. p. 440.
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humanity. The triumph of predatory authority in the enforcement of our
laws and the interpretation of our Constitution. Must it be so? Of course
not. What must be done? Protest, complain, ring the bell, sound the alarm,
and hope that we are successful before it is too late.
Therefore, since alternatives exist in litigation for the protection of the
landowner in bona fide cases of governmental takings (the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Sherman and Clayton Acts and Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act), which are not only-available but viable, we have a right to
demand that our Constitution and the Fifth Amendment not be twisted
and interpreted into bizarre shapes and forms. What the Court has done is
to simply make excuses for a bygone era in the face of change, engaging in
legal sophistry which will ultimately destroy respect for its authority. In
our society even the Court cannot insulate itself from the people and the
needs of reality. Justice is not merely a commodity, sold to a variety of
litigants on an ad hoc basis. When the Court refuses to act in and for society
the demands of justice drive these values into the streets. The demands of
justice require the Court to exercise rational authority while allowing the
law to serve the real, and not the manufactured needs of the people. Among
those real needs are the protection of the public lands.
As far as a proper approach to judicial review of "takings" regulation
is concerned, we ought not let Holmes rewrite the Constitution as he did in
Pennsylvania Coal. If we follow the Brandeis dissent and accept the
proposition that regulation is different in kind from a "taking" the full
panopoly of due process protection is left intact; however, the focus has
been reset upon the purpose and effect of the regulation, and this, we must
all agree, is where the emphasis really belongs..
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